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FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0535
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7664
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0829
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0517
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 6619
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004263

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016

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SUBJECT: FURTHER BACKGROUND ON UAE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO
LEBANON

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 4239, B) STATE 183255, C) ABU DHABI 4213,
D) ABU DHABI 3686

Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

¶1. (C) DATT and USLO Chief discussed UAE security assistance to Lebanon November 9 with UAE Armed Forces Director of Logistics MG Obaid Al-Heri Salem Al-Ketbi, following up on prior conversations with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed's International Affairs Director Yousef Al-Otaiba (ref A). Al-Ketbi noted the UAE's extensive involvement in Lebanon and specifically GHQ's role in building and operating a medical center in Beirut, constructing/rehabilitating 30 police stations, and building schools, in addition to donations of materiel. He said the UAE officer in Beirut (see ref A) was responsible for coordinating support and relaying GOL priorities to the UAEG.

¶2. (S) Al-Ketbi said the UAE was involved in GCC-wide coordination of military goods to Lebanon with UAE State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed at the center of the effort for the UAE. A list of GOL requirements was being considered by each GCC state. Regarding potential UAE contributions, GHQ had prepared a list of things it could contribute if asked; Sheikh Hazza had this list and would coordinate with the GCC, although that process could take time and Al-Ketbi could not comment on the substance of those discussions -- he did say GHQ had not yet received any specific tasking for support within the framework of the GCC effort.

¶3. (C) Al-Ketbi did clarify that GHQ had purchased for delivery 4 million rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition, had transferred from its stocks 5,000 Kalashnikov rifles, had purchased for Lebanon 5,500 Arsenal rifles from Bulgaria (compatible with the 5.56 mm ammunition), and that the UAE thinks the LAF needs 499 HMMV vehicles rather than the 1,000 noted ref B.

¶4. (C) Regarding communications systems, Al-Ketbi said the GOL requested from the UAE a 10-million dollar police radio system, but that the UAE had not agreed to provide the system due to the lack of a national infrastructure in Lebanon to support it. Contrary to Yousef Al-Otaiba's characterization

(ref A), Al-Ketbi said the UAE does have TETRA systems communications and had reviewed GOL requests for a similar network. The UAE determined, however, that Lebanon's communications infrastructure could not at present support this system. Building the infrastructure required would put the price tag well above the \$60 million purchase cost of the TETRA system.

SISON